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Abstract 
This paper examines price dispersion and price discrimination in airline fares across different 
domestic routes. It studies whether industry competition - market concentration and market 
share - affects ticket price dispersion and price discrimination. The analysis shows that price 
dispersion in fares across routes is negatively correlated with market concentration, but 
positively correlated with market share. The presence of airlines with relatively small market 
shares within a route that is dominated by a major airline leads to negative correlations 
between price dispersion and market shares. However, price discrimination only increases for 
certain ticket restrictions as competition decreases, where the presence of low cost carriers 
may be a contributing factor. 
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1. Introduction/Literature Review 
This paper examines airline ticket price dispersion and price discrimination across 
different domestic routes. It studies whether industry competition - market concentration and 
market share - affects ticket price dispersion and price discrimination. The analysis shows 
that price dispersion in fares is negatively correlated with market concentration, but 
positively correlated with market share. The presence of airlines with relatively small market 
shares within a route that is dominated by a major airline leads to negative correlations 
between price dispersion and market shares. I find evidence that price discrimination 
increases with competition for only certain ticket restrictions, where the presence of low cost 
carriers may be a contributing factor. 
 Major changes have occurred in the U.S. airline industry since the implementation of 
the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. As the federal Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
removed its grip on fares, routes and market entry regulation in the airline industry, there has 
been unprecedented growth within the industry, especially in terms of productivity (Kahn, 
1993). Lower fares have also been reported after deregulation and the flexibility of the 
industry yielded higher dispersion in fares. Lower market barriers encouraged airlines to 
increase the number of service routes, thus providing consumers with more options to choose 
from (Kahn, 1993). As a result, there exist wide variation in airline ticket price across routes.  
 According to Borenstein and Rose (1994), airline ticket price dispersion increases on 
highly competitive routes and low operating flight density routes, which is “consistent with 
discrimination based on customer’s willingness to switch to alternative airlines or flights.” 
On the other hand, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) conclude differently. They find that price 
dispersion decreases with competition, especially for routes with consumers of relatively 
homogenous elasticity. This observation is consistent with the textbook version of price 
discrimination theory. It is no surprise that the authors come to different conclusions, since 
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they used different empirical methods and analytical datasets: Borenstein and Rose (1994) 
use a cross-sectional dataset from 1986, whereas Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) use a panel 
dataset from 1993 to 2006. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) cite the emergence of low cost 
carriers and exploitation of changes in competition over time as possible reasons behind the 
difference in estimates. 
Several airline mergers and bankruptcies took place after the deregulation of the 
airline industry. As a result, the overall industry became more concentrated. However, Kahn 
(1993) suggests that concentration in individual routes is more important than concentration 
in the national level, as travelers only consider choices given a specific route. The 
combination of higher and lower market concentration at the national level and in individual 
routes respectively resulted in a two-tiered market condition. This complex market structure 
contributes to an increase of price discrimination practices among airlines, as airlines are no 
longer restricted by direct price regulations (Kahn, 1993). 
Basic economic intuition suggests that price discrimination increases with market 
concentration. However, several literatures seem to conclude otherwise. An empirical study 
by Stavins (1996) finds that price discrimination decreases with market concentration within 
the airline industry (price discrimination is higher on routes with more competition). The 
Stavins (1996) study is supported by similar theoretical findings in Borenstein (1985) and 
Holmes (1989).  
The aforementioned studies provide a framework in which the patterns of market 
competition, ticket price dispersion and price discrimination can be further explored. This 
paper examines airline prices in two major parts. First, I analyze a government dataset from 
the second quarter of 2013 in order to understand price dispersion in the airline industry for 
the most recent time period. I also examine the recent relationship between competition and 
price dispersion using price discrimination theories. In the second section, I use a transaction 
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dataset from the fourth quarter of 2004 to investigate whether price discrimination increases 
or decreases as market competition increases. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the economic motivation behind 
the airline pricing system, while Section 3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 4 
describes the dataset. Section 5 elaborates on the descriptive statistics and Section 6 discusses 
the results. Last but not least, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Motivation 
According to Stigler (1987), price discrimination is defined as the practice of having 
two or more similar commodities sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs. 
Economic theory suggests that not all firms can price discriminate, one example being firms 
in perfectly competitive markets. In order for firms to price discriminate successfully, it is 
important that there exist a heterogeneous group of consumers with varying degrees of 
willingness-to-pay so that the market can be segmented. Furthermore, the possession of some 
market power is necessary for firms to charge prices higher than the marginal cost. Low 
chances for consumers to arbitrage price differences also influence a firm’s ability to price 
discriminate. 
Airline ticket pricing is an excellent example of price discrimination. Consumers of 
airline tickets have different willingness-to-pay and demand elasticities. Although airlines are 
unable to charge each consumer differently (as they have no knowledge of the individual’s 
willingness-to-pay), they are able to segment the market based on different demand 
elasticities using self-sorting mechanisms such as Saturday night stay and non-refundable 
tickets.  
Price dispersion can arise from price discrimination and cost variation. Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) explain the correlation between price discrimination and price dispersion, using 
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factors such as market structure, population characteristics, and product attributes; as well as 
cost variation within the market. In the first section of this study, I focus on the correlation 
between price dispersion and price discrimination based on competition between firms. 
Monopolistic firms are more likely to price discriminate than oligopolistic firms; therefore, I 
expect a decrease in price dispersion as the level of competition increases, holding all else 
constant.  
Additionally, Stavins (1996) states that price discrimination could increase or 
decrease with competition: price discrimination decreases as carriers lower their overall ticket 
prices. Price discrimination increases with competition when carriers segment their market 
based on demand elasticities of tourists and business travelers: carriers charge tourists at 
marginal costs and business travelers at higher markups. The second section of this study 
focuses on the relationship between market concentration and price discrimination. Following 
the Borenstein and Rose (1994) findings, I postulate that price discrimination decreases with 
market concentration, as it is likely that price discrimination and price dispersion are 
positively correlated.  
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Market Competition and Price Dispersion 
 Price dispersion is likely to differ across routes and airlines. Airline competitiveness 
also varies for different market routes. Therefore, in this paper, I aim to investigate the 
following questions: 
1. What is the magnitude of price dispersion across different markets with the same 
airport origin and how is it distributed? 
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2. How is price dispersion correlated with market share and market concentration 
respectively across routes? Also, how is price dispersion correlated with market share 
within each route?  
According to Borenstein and Rose (1994), price dispersion is essentially characterized 
by the inequality across the entire range of fares paid by customers, and can be measured by 
the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient captures the magnitude of price dispersion by 
providing the expected relative difference in fares as a ratio to the mean fare for a randomly 
drawn customer from a population. A Gini coefficient of zero implies perfect equality and a 
Gini coefficient of one suggests perfect inequality. Therefore, a low Gini coefficient indicates 
small dispersion of fares, whereas a high Gini coefficient implies large dispersion of fares. 
 In order to examine how price dispersion is correlated with market share and market 
concentration, I use the population correlation coefficient to measure the level of dependence 
between the variables. I calculate the correlation coefficient between market share and price 
dispersion (measured by the Gini coefficient) using the formula 
 
where  
€ 
cov(MarketShare,Gini) = E[(MarketShare − µMarketShare )(Gini − µGini)] 
assuming that market share has mean µMarketShare and standard deviation σMarketShare and Gini 
has mean µGini and standard deviation σGini. 
Similarly, the correlation between market concentration and price dispersion is calculated by  
€ 
ρMarketConcentration,Gini =
cov(MarketConcentration,Gini)
σMarketConcentrationσGini
 
where 
€ 
cov(MarketConcentration,Gini) = E[(MarketConcentration − µMarketConcentration )(Gini − µGini)] 
€ 
ρMarketShare,Gini =
cov(MarketShare,Gini)
σMarketShareσGini
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assuming that market concentration has mean µMarketConcentration and standard deviation 
σMarketConcentration and Gini has mean µGini and standard deviation σGini.  
Although monopoly models suggest that price discrimination increases as market 
share increases, Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) argue that competitive based price 
discrimination may result in a negative correlation between price dispersion and market 
share. Carriers with large market shares in competitive type markets may be less responsive 
to cross-price elasticities in terms of price setting (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Similarly, 
increases in market concentration may lead to increases or decreases in price discrimination, 
depending on the market structure. Therefore, I can expect either a positive or negative 
correlation coefficient between price discrimination and market share or market 
concentration. Since cost variations and other factors influencing price discrimination such as 
population characteristics cannot be accounted for in the population correlation model, the 
sign of the correlation coefficient of price dispersion and market share or market 
concentration is unknown.  
 
3.2 Market Competition and Price Discrimination 
Various literatures conclude that price discrimination decreases with market 
concentration. In this paper, I aim to test whether this hypothesis still holds in a more recent 
timeline. I apply Stavins’ (1996) methods to estimate the effect of market competition on 
price discrimination: I first estimate a restricted model, where price discrimination is assumed 
not to vary with market concentration; and then a restricted model, where price 
discrimination is assumed to vary with market concentration.  
 
3.2.1 Restricted Model 
 The regression equation for the restricted model is as follows: 
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€ 
Pijk = β0 + β1Rijk + β2HHIi + β3MSij + β4Disti + β5DistSqi + β6AvgPopi + β7AvgInci + β8Hubij +
β9Slotsi + β10OneWayijk + β11TicketClassijk + β12Daysijk + β13LCCi + β14SWi + β15Tourist +ε ijk
 
where P is the round-trip fare; R refers to ticket restrictions (advanced purchase, non-
refundable, Saturday stay-over, travel days restriction, minimum and maximum stay 
requirement); HHI is the route specific Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; MS is the carrier 
specific market share calculated based on the share of passengers travelling on an airline 
within a route; Dist and DistSq are the distance and distance squared of a particular route; 
AvgPop and AvgInc represent the average population and average per-capita income of the 
two corresponding airport cities respectively; Hub is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
carrier has a hub in either the origin or destination airport; Slots is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the endpoint airports regulate the number of landing slots; OneWay is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the itinerary entails a one-way trip, TicketClass equals to 1 if any 
segment of itinerary involved travel in full coach fare class and Days refers to the number of 
days prior to departure when the ticket was purchased. The two additional variables which I 
included in the model (but are not included in Stavins’ (1996) model) are LCC and SW, 
which are indicator variables that equals 1 if low cost carriers and Southwest airlines are 
operating within the route respectively. Also, instead of using regional temperature as a proxy 
for tourist measure, the actual tourist share is used, denoted by Tourist. Subscript i refers to a 
market route, j refers to a carrier and k refers to an single itinerary.  
 
3.2.2 Unrestricted Model 
 The regression equation for the unrestricted model is as follows: 
€ 
Pijk = β0 + Rijk (γ 0 + γ1HHIi + γ 2MSij ) + β1HHIi + β2MSij + β3Disti + β4DistSqi + β5AvgPopi +
β6AvgInci + β7Hubij + β8Slotsi + β9OneWayijk + β10TicketClassijk + β11Daysijk + β12LCCi + β13SWi +
β15Tourist +ε ijk
 
Jia Rong Chua 
 
	   9	  
where the variables are defined in a similar fashion as described in Section 3.2.1. The 
interaction terms allows the effect of price discrimination to vary with market concentration, 
thus yielding  
€ 
∂Pijk
∂Rijk
= γ 0 + γ1HHIi + γ 2MSij  
where
€ 
γ1	  and	  
€ 
γ 2	  refer to the effect of market concentration and market share on price 
discrimination, respectively.  
 
4. Data  
4.1 Market Competition and Price Dispersion 
 The data used in the first section of this study is constructed using information 
obtained from Databank 1B (DB1B) of the United States Department of Transportation. It 
contains ticket itinerary and price details of a 10% random sample of all U.S. domestic airline 
tickets. Each observation in the dataset consists of a pair of origin and destination airports, 
total distance travelled, round-trip indicators, operating carrier and fare levels (round-trip or 
one-way) as well as the number of passengers travelling on a particular fare.  
 One-way fares are used in the analysis for simplicity purposes; with reported fares of 
round-trip itineraries halved. I classify the top 10% of fares as first-class or business class 
tickets and they are excluded due to the difficulty of addressing variations in costs across 
different types of tickets (Borenstein and Rose, 1994).  Furthermore, I exclude observations 
with reported fares of $10 and less, since they are most likely frequent-flyer redemption trips. 
The analysis is also restricted to carrier-routes in which fare information is available for at 
least 10 customers. Due to time constraints, I narrow observations to flights from Detroit 
Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW) to the following nine destinations: 
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Destination Airport Airport Code 
Boston Logan International Airport BOS 
Denver International Airport DEN 
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport DFW 
Los Angeles International Airport LAX 
Las Vegas McCarran International Airport LAS 
New York City LaGuardia Airport LGA 
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport PHX 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport SEA 
San Francisco International Airport SFO 
Table 1: Choice of Destination Airports 
This results in a total of 4939 observations 
 The price dispersion is measured by a Gini coefficient computed using one-half the 
ratio of the mean difference to the mean. In the context of this paper, I follow Borenstein and 
Rose’s (1994) definition of a market: a route consisting of a pair of origin and destination 
airports. For instance, flights from DTW to BOS are considered in one market, and flights 
from DTW to LGA are in another. Next, I characterize competition by market share and 
market concentration. Market share of each carrier is equal to the ratio of the number of 
customers flying on a particular carrier-route to the total number of customers flying on that 
particular route. For example, the market share of American Airlines in the DTW - BOS 
airport-pair market is calculated as the ratio of number customers flying in American Airlines 
from DTW to BOS to the total number of customers flying from DTW to BOS. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures market concentration, for each airport-
pair market is equal to the sum of squares of market share held by each carrier operating 
within the market. 
 
4.2 Market Competition and Price Discrimination 
 The dataset used in the second section of this study is obtained from Sengupta and 
Wiggins (2014) via the American Economic Journal (AEJ). According to the authors, the 
final dataset is assembled using different data sources: contemporaneous transaction data 
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purchased from a major computer reservation system (CRS), ticket restriction information 
obtained from travel agent systems, T-100 Segment data accessed via the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, business share index derived by Borenstein (2010), and the U.S. Census for 
the year 2003. The transaction period falls on the fourth quarter of year 2004, which includes 
peak travel period such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years. To avoid estimation 
biases, Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) excluded itineraries on Thanksgiving week and after 
December 22, 2004. They also collected ticket restriction information from a local travel 
agent, as the CRS company was unable to provide the relevant information due to 
confidentiality. A subset of itinerary information (the remaining data was randomly erased 
due to the time difference in the actual data collection process) was matched with the 
transaction data to obtain restrictions on the individual tickets. Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) 
also applied a matching rule to overcome the limitations of the subset of travel agent data: if 
two prices from the dataset match within 2%, it is considered as a match if other ticket 
characteristics such as carrier, booking class, and restrictions are the same. They also 
followed Borenstein and Rose (1994) method of excluding first and business class itineraries. 
The dataset also only includes direct travel itineraries, as the number of itineraries with a 
stopover is small (approximately 2%).  
 Each observation in the dataset consists of information on a single itinerary: pair of 
origin and destination airport1, operating carrier, one-way travel indicators, ticket class, 
number of days prior to departure after ticket purchase, restrictions, market competition 
measures, population and airport attributes of the route. The ticket restrictions are advanced 
purchase requirement, non-refundable, Saturday night stay-over, travel days restrictions, 
minimum and maximum stay requirement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The list of endpoint airports and cities included in Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) study can 
be accessed through https://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/0601/2009-0200_app.pdf 
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In addition, the market competition measures included are market share and 
concentration. Market share is the share of passengers travelling on a particular airline within 
a route calculated based on the T-100 Segment dataset. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which measures market concentration, is calculated as the sum of squares of a 
carrier’s market share within a route.  
 On the other hand, the population and airport attributes are characterized by distance 
between origin and destination airports, tourist share (calculated using a business share index 
derived by Borenstein (2010), average population, average per capita income of the two 
endpoints of the route (obtained from the U.S. Census 2003), airport hub indicators (if the 
origin or the destination airport is a hub) and slot restricted airports indicators (if an airport 
has restricted slots). A list of routes included in the study can be found in the Appendix 
section. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Market Competition and Price Dispersion  
 This section presents some descriptive statistics and graphical analysis of airline ticket 
fares. I use boxplots to illustrate the entire range of consumer-paid fares within each market 
route and highlight the variation of fares for routes and airlines. The tables and figures show 
that fare range patterns vary for different airport-pair market routes and different airlines 
within a route. 
Destination Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N2 Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
BOS 282.0 124.6 1516 10.5 611.0 211.8 247.5 343.0 0.889 
DEN 140.2 62.8 6044 10.5 281.5 88.5 144.5 176.5 0.065 
DFW 195.6 97.8 2693 10.5 451.0 135.0 165.5 234.0 1.024 
LAS 174.6 46.6 7672 10.5 286.5 145.0 171.0 204.5 0.024 
LAX 229.7 100.1 3686 10.5 534.0 160.0 200.0 270.0 1.037 
LGA 164.5 94.3 9798 10.5 511.5 118.5 143.0 170.0 2.074 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Total number of customers  
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PHX 214.1 61.39 2717 10.5 385.5 180.5 200.0 232.0 0.639 
SEA 279.5 105.2 1188 10.5 561.0 213.5 266.0 334.3 0.304 
SFO 281.1 115.5 2101 10.5 605.0 205.5 251.5 334.0 0.770 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to different airport destinations 
 
To read the boxplots: the line within the box represents the median (50th percentile); the top and bottom edge of 
the box represents the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile; and the top and bottom edge of the line represents 
the maximum and minimum of values, which excludes outliers; the dots (which may look like lines in bold) 
represents the outliers of the data 
Source: Databank DB1B from Department of Transportation 
 
Figure 1: Boxplot of Fares from DTW to each destination 
 
Based on Figure 1 and Table 2, fares to BOS, SEA and SFO have high ranges, 
interquartile ranges and standard deviations. This observation implies large variation in fares 
to BOS, SEA and SFO. Conversely, fare variation is small for flights to DEN, LAS and PHX, 
as the fares have low ranges and standard deviations. In addition, fares to LGA, LAS and 
PHX have low interquartile ranges, which suggest consistent pricing (around the mean) for 
these routes. The converse applies to the BOS, SEA and SFO market route. Positive 
skewnesses of fares across all destinations show that airlines price more of their fares higher 
0
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Fares by Destination
destination
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than the mean. Fares to DEN and LAS have the lowest skewness, whereas fares to LGA and 
LAX have the highest skewness. It is likely that airlines operating in DTW - DEN and DTW 
- LAS price their fare nearer to the mean than airlines in other markets, and vice versa for 
airlines operating in DTW - LAX and DTW – LGA. 
Table 2 shows that flights to DEN, LGA and LAS have large customer bases. These 
routes also have relatively low mean and median fares. In contrast, flights with small 
customer bases, such as BOS, SEA and SFO, have relatively high means and medians. Fare 
levels are implicitly influenced by the demand curves of customers who fly to these 
destinations and competition from low cost carriers. Business travelers may travel more often 
to Boston, Seattle and San Francisco for conferences, thus increasing the mean and median 
fares associated with these routes. On the other hand, tourists may choose to travel to cheaper 
destinations based on their demand elasticities. The significant presence of low-cost carriers 
such as Spirit and Frontier in routes to Denver, New York and Las Vegas allows customers 
with high demand elasticities to travel. The mean and median of fares to these three 
destinations are lower than others, as tickets sold by low-cost carriers are cheaper compared 
to non-low-cost carriers. 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 254.1 118.4 14 127.0 485.0 158.0 197.5 386.0 0.649 
Delta 308.5 133.2 986 10.5 611.0 230.0 264.5 369.5 0.607 
United 182.4 98.8 53 77.5 521.0 109.0 171.5 212.5 1.744 
US 237.7 84.1 382 98.0 605.0 177.5 230.5 272.0 1.475 
Southwest 237.6 80.3 80 98.0 479.0 204.0 226.3 266.5 0.836 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to BOS on different airlines 
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To read the boxplots: the line within the box represents the median (50th percentile); the top and bottom edge of 
the box represents the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile; and the top and bottom edge of the line represents 
the maximum and minimum of values, which excludes outliers; the dots represents the outliers of the data 
Source: Databank DB1B from Department of Transportation 
 
Figure 2: Boxplot of fares from DTW to BOS on different airlines 
 According to Table 3 and Figure 2, Delta has the highest range and standard deviation 
of fares, whereas Southwest has the lowest range and standard deviation of fares. This 
suggests that Delta and Southwest have the largest and smallest variation in fares within the 
DTW – BOS market respectively. The large interquartile fare range of American suggests 
non-consistency in fare pricing about mean, and the opposite applies to Southwest. The small 
customer base of American combined with its practice of charging low prices on most of its 
customers and high price on others (yield management practices) explain the large 
interquartile range and low median I find for American. Table 3 also shows that Delta has the 
largest number of customers, and the highest mean and median fare. Delta’s large market 
share within the route allows it to price its fares higher than its competitors.  
 Similar explanations apply to the tables and boxplots of fares from DTW to the 
remaining eight destinations listed in Table 1, although the context may be different for each 
airline. The corresponding figures and tables can be found in the Appendix. 
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5.2 Market Competition and Price Discrimination 
 The descriptive statistics and correlation tables for the second dataset can be found in 
the Appendix section3.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Market Concentration and Price Dispersion 
  In this section, I discuss the relationship between price dispersion and market share 
as well as market concentration. I first present a summary of price dispersion and market 
concentration for different airport-pair markets, followed by a description of price dispersion 
and market shares of different carriers for each destination airport subgroup. 
Destination Gini coefficient Herfindahl 
BOS 0.2372 .4912481 
DEN 0.2549 .2839061 
DFW 0.2640 .3445098 
LAS 0.1495 .3623434 
LAX 0.2331 .3755926 
LGA 0.2677 .3420193 
PHX 0.1509 .379772 
SEA 0.2082 .5074808 
SFO 0.2233 .5886304 
Table 4: Gini coefficients of fares and HHI of different airport-pair markets  
 According to Table 4, fares to LGA have the greatest dispersion, with an expected 
price difference4 of 53.54% from the mean fare. On the other hand, fares to LAS have the 
smallest dispersion, with an expected price difference of 29.9% from the mean fare. 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) - a measure of market concentration - is the 
highest for DTW – SFO airport-pair market, thus implying a lack of competition within the 
route. This is reflected by Delta’s huge market share of 75.68%, with each of the remaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Refer to Table 18 
4 Expected price difference = 2 × Gini coefficient 
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carriers owning less than 10% of the DTW – SFO market5. Conversely, the DTW – DEN 
airport-pair market exhibits the lowest Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which suggests that 
competition is moderate within the market, as implied by Spirit and Delta’s relatively equal 
market share of 33.32% and 37.59%6.  
 The correlation coefficient between market concentration and price dispersion is 
reported to be -0.1340, and this indicates that price dispersion is negatively correlated with 
market concentration. Although monopolistic price discrimination theory postulates that price 
dispersion and market concentration are positively correlated, the negative correlation that I 
find in the data comes from the specific competitive type market structure within the routes. 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) also find this negative correlation in their data. In the 
competitive type market structure, carriers compete on different segments of cross-price 
elasticities (Borenstein, 1985 and Holmes, 1989). Carriers are forced to lower their fares for 
consumers with high demand elasticities (tourists) as competition increases; but are still able 
to maintain fares for consumers with low demand elasticities (business travelers) based on its 
unique market niche. This results in an increase of price discrimination.  
 Additional analysis shows that market share and Gini coefficient are positively 
correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.1922. Although this corresponds with the 
expected sign postulated by monopolistic price discrimination theory, the competitive type 
market theory developed by Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) – which results in a 
negative correlation sign – is more relevant in this case. The difference in correlation signs 
can be explained by a high magnitude spillover effect due to origin and destination airport 
dominance by certain airlines7. However, airport dominance does not imply a lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 refer Figure 19 in Appendix 
6 refer Figure 12 in Appendix 
7 refer Table 6 
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competition within the routes. The formation of airline hubs, which results in airport 
dominance, allows airlines to transport their customers efficiently and maximize revenues.  
 There are two possible explanations for the positive correlation coefficient between 
price dispersion and market share: origin airport dominance by Delta, or destination airport 
dominance by other airlines. None of the airlines has a hub in Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
Country Airport (DTW) except for Delta Airlines, as indicated by its market share. 
According to Figures 11 – 19 in the Appendix, Delta accounts for a minimum market share of 
37.59% of total customers flying to DEN and a maximum market share of 75.68% of total 
customers flying to SFO. Delta’s huge market shares also implies that customers who fly 
often from DTW are more likely to own a Delta frequent flyer plan than another airline’s 
frequent flyer plan. Borenstein and Rose (1994) postulate that frequent flyer plans can result 
in a reduction of cross-elasticities through increments in ticket value or incentives. Therefore, 
customer participation in Delta’s frequent flyer plans may result in an increase of price 
discrimination, as these customers are less responsive to fare increments compared to the 
regular customer base. The same argument applies to airlines that dominate other 
destinations. 
Destination Correlation Coefficient 
BOS -0.1311 
DEN 0.5769 
DFW 0.5084 
LAS 0.3541 
LAX 0.3733 
LGA 0.2075 
PHX 0.1591 
SEA -0.2451 
SFO 0.3682 
Table 5: Correlation coefficients of market share and Gini coefficent for each destination 
 Based on the destination-subgroup analysis on price dispersion and market share 
(presented in Table 5), I find positive correlation coefficients for flights to all destination 
airports except for BOS and SEA. Delta has several hubs across the U.S. other than its major 
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hub in DTW, four of which are destination airports included in the analysis of this paper: 
BOS, LAX, LGA and SEA. Two out of four of Delta’s hubs report negative correlation 
coefficients between market share and price dispersion. Further research on airport hubs8 
shows that destination airports that only Delta uses as a hub (BOS and SEA) are the ones that 
reported the negative correlation coefficients. Conversely, destinations that act as hubs or 
focus cities for multiple U.S. domestic airlines (including Delta), report positive correlation 
coefficients.  
 The negative correlation coefficient of market share and Gini coefficient of fares 
within the DTW - BOS and DTW - SEA market indicates that as market share increases, 
price dispersion decreases. Figure 2 and Figure 9 show that Delta possesses the highest range 
of fares within the markets. Furthermore, Delta has over 60% of market share in these two 
routes9, and is the sole domestic airline that uses these two destination airports as hubs. The 
negative correlation between price dispersion and market share for flights to BOS is due to 
the presence of US Airways, which has a small market share but high price dispersion10, 
within the market. Likewise, Figure 9 provides a similar explanation for the negative 
correlation between price dispersion and market share for flights to SEA. The figure shows 
that all airlines that operate from DTW to SEA show high price dispersion even though all 
airlines except Delta have low market shares11. Therefore, the presence of airlines with low 
market shares in a route that is dominated by another airline does not prevent other airlines 
from offering a variety of ticket prices to consumers. On the other hand, the positive 
correlation coefficient that I find for the remaining subgroups can be explained using the 
argument presented in the previous paragraph regarding destination airport dominance by 
airlines, which induces customer participation in frequent flyer plans.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 refer Table 6 
9 refer Figure 11 and Figure 18 in Appendix 
10 refer Figure 2 and Figure 11 in Appendix 
11 refer Figure 18 in Appendix 
Jia Rong Chua 
 
	   20	  
 
Airline Hubs / Focus Cities12 
 (destinations included in the analysis) 
American DFW, LAX 
Delta BOS, LAX, LGA, SEA 
Frontier - 
AirTran - 
Spirit DFW, LAS 
United DEN, LAX, SFO 
US PHX 
Southwest DEN, LAX, LAS, PHX 
Table 6: Hubs / Focus cities for different airlines 
 
6.2 Market Concentration and Price Discrimination 
 The regression equation for the restricted and unrestricted model is estimated using 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Carrier fixed effects are used to control for carrier 
specific characteristics.  
 
6.2.1 Restricted Model 
  According to Table 7, including a 1, 5, 7, 10, 14 and 21-day advance purchase 
restriction leads to, on average, a decrease within the range of $44 to $192 in round-trip fares. 
On the other hand, including a 3-day and 30-day advance purchase restriction leads to, on 
average, an increase of $54 and $27 in round-trip fares respectively. The coefficients on all 
types advance purchase restrictions are significant at the 1% level except for the 3-day and 
30-day restriction. Intuition generally suggest that those who purchase tickets earlier would 
pay a lower price than those who purchase it later, assuming that they are travelling within 
the same flight. In this case, we would expect to see a monotonic decrease in price as the 
number of days of advance purchase requirement increases, holding all else constant. 
However, the corresponding coefficients on advance purchase restriction indicate a relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Focus cities: a city that does not act as a hub for a specific airline, but behaves like a hub. 
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irregular pattern. One reason behind this observation is that airlines employ yield 
management practices in order to maximize their revenue, where they make use of shifts in 
market demand. 
  In addition, a non-refundable restriction leads to, on average, a $198 decrease in 
round-trip fares, and the coefficient is also statistically significant at the 1% level. A Saturday 
stay-over and a specific travel day restriction contributes to, on average, a $51 and $110 
decrease in round-trip fares respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1% level. A 
minimum-stay and a maximum-stay requirement also decrease round-trip fares by 
approximately $10 on average. Customers who purchase tickets with restrictions are 
generally leisure travelers who have higher demand elasticities. Given a menu of choices, 
leisure travelers would choose a combination that would allow them to pay the least to travel, 
as implied by the estimated coefficient of tourist share (.1 increase of tourist share is expected 
to decrease round-trip fares by $21). In contrast, business travelers who have greater 
opportunity costs for their time would prefer more flexibility when travelling to 
accommodate last-minute schedules. 
 A 0.1 increase in market share is expected to increase round-trip fares by $5.10, and a 
0.1 increase in market concentration is expected to decrease round-trip fares by $2.8 (round-
trip fares decrease with competition). Both the coefficients on market share and market 
concentration are statistically insignificant under cluster estimation13. Also, travelling to or 
from an airport hub is expected to increase round-trip fares by $50. A one-day increase in 
days prior to departure after ticket purchase would result in a decrease $0.48 in fares, on 
average. The purchase of a full coach fare class ticket and a one-way ticket results in an 
average increase of $307 and $45 on round-trip fares respectively, whereas the presence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Errors are clustered at the carrier-route level: error terms are likely to be correlated for 
itineraries issued by the same carrier on a particular route. The coefficients of market share 
and market concentration are significant without cluster estimation. It is likely that there 
exists a negative correlation within each carrier-route level. 
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Southwest and other low cost carriers is expected to decrease fares by approximately $100 
and $36 respectively.  
 Round-trip fare 
Market Structure Variables  
Market Share 51.388158 
 (59.941240) 
HHI -28.837373 
 (68.478187) 
Hub 50.057632 
 (20.611945)* 
Slot Restricted Airport 87.100469 
 (32.870184)** 
Ticket Characteristics  
Advance Purchase Restriction 
[Omitted: No advance purchase restriction] 
 
1-day -143.218862 
 (47.968022)** 
3-day 54.266518 
 (28.881221) 
5-day -192.327519 
 (27.745789)** 
7-day -44.484323 
 (15.846246)** 
10-day -62.518663 
 (16.946571)** 
14-day -60.285684 
 (13.084102)** 
21-day -50.006183 
 (18.310591)** 
30-day 27.260116 
 (35.055119) 
Non-refundable -198.547479 
 (47.724305)** 
Saturday stay-over -51.822448 
 (7.188859)** 
Travel restriction -110.407665 
 (11.474846)** 
Minimum stay requirement -12.519276 
 (12.720955) 
Maximum stay restriction -9.649725 
 (13.617966) 
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -0.483676 
 (0.142180)** 
Full coach fare class 307.276664 
 (57.527585)** 
One-way 45.713543 
 (7.809944)** 
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Route-specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carriers -36.298352 
 (19.305641) 
Presence of Southwest airlines -100.943438 
 (29.792047)** 
Distance 0.428587 
 (0.098781)** 
Distance squared -0.000095 
 (0.000032)** 
Tourist -214.690205 
 (109.384709) 
Average Population 0.000002 
 (0.000008) 
Average Per-capita Income -0.003283 
 (0.003373) 
Constant 503.760289 
 (154.008212)** 
Carrier fixed effects Yes 
R2 0.49 
N 453,347 
To read the table: The regression coefficients are the numbers above the brackets. The numbers within the 
brackets are the corresponding standard deviation of the estimates. * represents significance at the 5% level, 
and ** represents significance at the 1% level 
Regression equation:
 
 
Table 7: Regression estimates of restricted model. 
 
6.2.2 Unrestricted Model 
 In this section, I analyze the effect of market concentration on price discrimination for 
each separate ticket restriction. Table 8 provides the coefficients estimates of the unrestricted 
model under the non-refundable ticket restriction, for which I obtain the competition effect 
equation of 
€ 
∂Pijk
∂Rijk
= −138.41+ 24.71HHIi − 260.36MSij . The equation implies that holding 
market share constant, an increase in market concentration would lead to a decrease in price 
discrimination (i.e. a higher price for a non-refundable ticket). The results are not statistically 
significant at any level14 under the assumption that errors are clustered. However, the sign of 
the estimated coefficient is consistent with the competitive type price discrimination theory. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Coefficients are significant when standard errors are not clustered 
€ 
Pijk = β0 + β1Rijk + β2HHIi + β3MSij + β4Disti + β5DistSqi + β6AvgPopi + β7AvgInci + β8Hubij +
β9Slotsi + β10OneWayijk + β11TicketClassijk + β12Daysijk + β13LCCi + β14SWi + β15Tourist +ε ijk
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According to Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), carriers segment their market based on 
different consumer demand elasticities, and compete with each other within these segments. 
Price discrimination increases with competition when carriers lower their fares for leisure 
travelers and charge business travelers higher fares using its unique market niche. Similar 
results hold for the minimum-stay and maximum-stay ticket restriction15. 
 Round-trip fare 
Interaction terms  
Market share * Non-refundable -260.368368 
 (176.033133) 
HHI * Non-refundable 24.714838 
 (321.614540) 
Market structure variables  
Market share 272.170725 
 (182.548661) 
HHI -57.970199 
 (301.028642) 
Hub 49.738963 
 (22.523207)* 
Slot restricted airport 85.066979 
 (34.864624)* 
Ticket characteristics  
Non-refundable -138.410798 
 (151.383587) 
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -1.621332 
 (0.176057)** 
Full coach fare class 312.628219 
 (47.549918)** 
One-way 79.484790 
 (7.996727)** 
Route specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carrier -32.946715 
 (18.958434) 
Presence of Southwest airlines -97.705760 
 (30.383746)** 
Distance  0.404993 
 (0.107354)** 
Distance squared -0.000090 
 (0.000035)* 
Tourist share -238.400054 
 (117.005072)* 
Average population 0.000002 
 (0.000009) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 refer Table 22 and Table 23 
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Average per-capita income -0.005032 
 (0.003760) 
Constant  464.702587 
 (224.620956)* 
Carrier Fixed Effects Yes 
R2 0.44 
N 453,347 
To read the table: The regression coefficients are the numbers above the brackets. The numbers within the 
brackets are the corresponding standard deviation of the estimates. * represents significance at the 5% level, 
and ** represents significance at the 1% level 
Regression equation:  
 
Table 8: Regression estimates of the unrestricted model under non-refundable ticket 
restrictions 
  
 On the other hand, the coefficient estimates under Saturday stay-over restriction 
illustrates the opposite relationship between price discrimination and competition. Based on 
Table 9, I acquire the equation 
€ 
∂Pijk
∂Rijk
= −27.51− 0.07HHIi − 90.37MSij , which implies that as 
market concentration increases, price discrimination increases, holding market share 
constant. The difference in expected sign may be due to the presence of low cost carriers. 
Low cost carriers generally target consumers with high demand elasticities such as tourists; 
hence, they might segment their consumers differently when compared to regular carriers. It 
is likely that consumers travelling using low cost carriers are more similar to each other (a 
larger, more diverse group of leisure travelers and a few business travelers) than consumers 
travelling with a regular carrier (a combination of less leisure travelers and more business 
travelers). Therefore, the competitive price discrimination model might not apply perfectly in 
this context. Furthermore, although ticket restrictions are all price discrimination measures, 
they are inherently different pricing strategies such that low cost carriers might discriminate 
more using one price discrimination measure than the other. It is plausible that Saturday night 
stay does not fall under this category, as the effect of price discrimination is visibly reduced 
€ 
Pijk = β0 + Rijk (γ 0 + γ1HHIi + γ 2MSij ) + β1HHIi + β2MSij + β3Disti + β4DistSqi + β5AvgPopi +
β6AvgInci + β7Hubij + β8Slotsi + β9OneWayijk + β10TicketClassijk + β11Daysijk + β12LCCi + β13SWi +
β15Tourist +ε ijk
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as competition increases. The coefficient estimates under the travel day restriction also 
exhibits the same results16. 
 Round-trip fare 
Interaction terms  
Market share * Saturday stay-over -90.375475 
 (48.422481) 
HHI * Saturday stay-over -0.075416 
 (102.082007) 
Market structure variables  
Market share  79.938790 
 (67.659713) 
HHI -2.833886 
 (93.300872) 
Hub 46.056635 
 (21.254146)* 
Slot restricted airport 91.532341 
 (31.194501)** 
Ticket characteristics  
Saturday stay-over -27.510922 
 (44.184869) 
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -1.628965 
 (0.176585)** 
Full coach fare class 436.558772 
 (62.696616)** 
One-way 92.037836 
 (9.558614)** 
Route specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carrier -48.745301 
 (19.645793)* 
Presence of Southwest airlines -73.628582 
 (27.863062)** 
Distance  0.307097 
 (0.095685)** 
Distance squared -0.000060 
 (0.000032) 
Tourist share -180.314800 
 (109.650615) 
Average population 0.000002 
 (0.000008) 
Average per capita income -0.003003 
 (0.003087) 
Constant 268.800337 
 (134.378329)* 
Carrier fixed effects Yes 
R2 0.38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 refer Table 21 
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N 453,347 
To read the table: The regression coefficients are the numbers above the brackets. The numbers within the 
brackets are the corresponding standard deviation of the estimates. * represents significance at the 5% level, 
and ** represents significance at the 1% level 
Regression equation:  
 
Table 9: Regression estimates of the unrestricted model under Saturday stay-over ticket 
restrictions 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper measures price dispersion of fares across different airlines and routes using 
the Gini coefficient, calculated based on data obtained from the most recent time period. It 
also examines the relationship between price dispersion and different measures of 
competition: market share and market concentration; and investigates the effect of market 
competition on price discrimination. Basic correlations show that price dispersion decreases 
with market concentration and increases with market share. One possible explanation for the 
negative correlation between price dispersion and market concentration is that airlines 
compete on different consumer segments. On the other hand, the positive correlation between 
price dispersion and market concentration can be explained by customers’ participation in 
frequent flyer plans as a result of origin and destination airport dominance by certain airlines. 
The analysis also indicates that the presence of airline hubs in origin and destination airports 
induces some difference in correlation coefficient signs of price dispersion and market share 
for different subgroups. The presence of competition in routes where an airline possesses a 
huge market share can cause price dispersion to correlate negatively with market share. I find 
that price discrimination increases with market competition only for certain ticket restrictions 
such as non-refundable, minimum-stay and maximum-stay tickets. It is likely that the 
competitive price discrimination model does not hold under the presence of low cost carriers 
due to different market segmentation between regular and low cost carriers. A limitation of 
€ 
Pijk = β0 + Rijk (γ 0 + γ1HHIi + γ 2MSij ) + β1HHIi + β2MSij + β3Disti + β4DistSqi + β5AvgPopi +
β6AvgInci + β7Hubij + β8Slotsi + β9OneWayijk + β10TicketClassijk + β11Daysijk + β12LCCi + β13SWi +
β15Tourist +ε ijk
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the method used in this paper is that it is unable to isolate the effect of price discrimination 
via market competition; and take into account other factors influencing price dispersion, such 
as cost variations.  
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Dominguez for her advice and guidance throughout whole 
research and writing process, my fellow classmates from ECON 495 for their helpful 
comments and suggestions; and Sweetland Writing Center for their help in editing this paper. 
 
References 
Kahn, A. (1993) “Airline Deregulation.” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of 
Economics and Liberty. 29 September 2014  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/AirlineDeregulation.html  
 
Borenstein, S. and Rose, N. (1994) “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline 
Industry.” Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 102, No. 4: pp. 653 – 683 
 
Borenstein, S. (1989) “Price Discrimination in Free Entry Markets.” Rand Journal of 
Economics. Vol 16, No. 20: pp. 344 - 365 
 
Borenstein, S. (2010) “An Index of Inter-City Business Travel for Use in Domestic Airline 
Competition Analysis.” http://www.nber.org/bti/BizTrvIdx.pdf. 
 
Gerardi, K. and Shapiro, S. (2009) “Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New 
Evidence from the Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 117, No. 1: pp. 1 – 
37 
 
Holmes, T. (1989) “The Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly.” 
American Economic Review. Vol 79: pp. 244 - 250 	  
Sengupta, A. and Wiggins, S. (2014) “Airline Pricing, Price Dispersion, and Ticket 
Characteristics On and Off the Internet” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Vol. 
6 No.1: pp. 272–307 
 
Stavins, J. (1996) “Price Discrimination in the Airline Market: The Effect of Market 
Concentration” Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 83 No. 1: pp. 200–202 
 
Stigler, G. (1987) “Theory of Price” New York: Macmillan. 
 
Jia Rong Chua 
 
	   29	  
Appendix 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 179.1 34.3 30 117.0 243.0 143.0 184.0 194.5 -0.128 
Delta 176.4 47.0 2272 10.5 281.5 145.0 171.5 208.5 -0.142 
Frontier 162.7 54.2 592 33.0 280.5 134.0 155.8 186.3 0.249 
AirTran 149.4 47.5 10 111.0 232.0 120.5 120.5 163.0 1.008 
Spirit 77.2 37.8 2014 11.0 225.0 50.0 64.0 95.0 1.090 
United 183.0 43.3 248 99.0 281.0 146.5 179.0 217.3 0.413 
US 219.2 38.8 18 169.0 275.0 200.5 206.0 247.5 0.218 
Southwest 161.0 40.6 860 84.5 280 112.75 153.3 177 217.5 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to DEN on different airlines 
 
 
Figure 3: Boxplot of fares from DTW to DEN on different airlines 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 217.5 86.8 549 63.0  451.0 160.5 169.0  265.0   1.194  
Delta 233.6  100.9 1238 10.5  451.0  160.5  179.0  316.5  0.725 
Spirit 117.1  39.3  800   11.0 320.0  89.0  114.0 150.0 0.483 
US 227.9 81.8 98 109.5 411.0 150.0 210.0 292.0 0.406 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to DFW on different airlines 
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Figure 4: Boxplot of fares from DTW to DFW on different airlines 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 192.3 38.3 23 145.5 273.5 157.0  190.0 221.0   0.653  
Delta 197.5 45.9  3342  10.5     286.5  168.5  195.0 228.5 -0.701 
Frontier 149.9 41.4 78 44.0 282.0 128.0 146.0 161.5 0.589 
AirTran 162.9 37.7 18 80.5 243.0 150.0 170.5 173.5 0.072 
Spirit 147.8 36.1  3014   60.0 283.0  125.0 145.0 170.0 0.296 
United 181.1 34.9 34 119.0 265.5 154.0 172.0 205.0 0.768 
US 199.8 39.8 140 69.5 277.5 169.5 213.0 219.0 -0.436 
Southwest 176.9 33.6 1023 107.5 284.0 153.0 169.5 196.5 0.884 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to LAS on different airlines 
 
 
Figure 5: Boxplot of fares from DTW to LAS on different airlines  
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Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 226.9 94.4 80 51  522 155.5 207.5 271.0    0.982 
Delta 254.7 105.1  2081  10.5  535 183.5  224.5  332.0  0.759 
Frontier 170.3 74.3 84 26.0 458.0 142.0 148.0  178.0 2.640 
Spirit 171.0 58.2  703 65.0 438.0  130.0  155.0 198.5 1.309 
United 280.1 102.9 75 105.5 522.0 191.5 269.0 340.0 0.742 
US 277.0 86.6 217 125.0 499.0 201.0 262.0 350.0 0.196 
Southwest 184.8 73.3 439 110.0 534.0 141.5 161.5 199.0 2.574 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to LAX on different airlines 
 
   
Figure 6: Boxplot of fares from DTW to LAX on different airlines 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 174.2 98.7 954 53.0 511.0 134.0  140.0  165.5   2.415  
Delta 197.3 109.1  4392 10.5  511.5 136.5 151.0  194.0  1.678 
Spirit 111.4  37.4  3460  40.0  225.0  76.0  107.5 143.0 0.359 
United 234.1 92.2 12 131.0 357.0 157.5 216.0 327.0 0.191 
US 195.4 70.5 792 71.0 495.0 142.8 176.0 232.0 1.083 
Southwest 193.6 82.2 188 105.5 382.5 132.0 176.0 212.5 1.218 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to LGA on different airlines 
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Figure 7: Boxplot of fares from DTW to LGA on different airlines 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 201.3 42.4 22 159.5 321.5 172.0  189.3  199.5   1.900  
Delta 218.9 67.3  1457  10.5 385.5  183.0  210.5  243.0  0.347 
Frontier 199.8 49.6 32 144.0 363.0 161.0 187.0 230.0 1.388 
United 212.9 76.8 47 79.0 356.5 166.6 221.5 255.0 -0.364 
US 205.6 54.9 528 120.0 384.5 177.0 187.0 220.3 1.374 
Southwest 211.2 50.2 631 112.5 384.0 182.0 201.0 224.5 1.147 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to PHX on different airlines 
 
 
Figure 8:  Boxplot of fares from DTW to PHX on different airlines 
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Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Skewness 
American 287.7 112.0 25 109.0 508.0 196.0  285.0  340.0   0.431  
Delta 289.6 105.2  824   10.5 561.0 245.5 282.5  348.0 0.174 
Frontier 239.2 70.4 45 123.0 394.0 175.0 247.0 272.0 0.355 
United 228.5 114.9 38 109.0 493.0 119.5 207.5 300.0 0.829 
US 285.9 107.5 114 26.0 549.0 213.0 283.0 355.0 0.091 
Southwest 240.8 93.8 142 120.0 553.0 178.0 240.8 276.5 1.100 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to SEA on different airlines 
 
 
Figure 9: Boxplot of fares from DTW to SEA on different airlines 
 
Airline Mean Standard 
Deviation 
N Min Max 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Skewness 
American 244.5 117.1 37 15.5 575.0 176.0 216.5 274.0    1.021 
Delta 285.8 120.1  1590 10.5 605.0  206.5 252.0  340.5  0.727 
Frontier 238.4 76.6 37 75.0 422.0 192.0 227.0 277.0 0.425 
AirTran 216.0 63.3 11 132.0 397.5 132.0 227.0 282.0 -0.171 
United 322.2 115.6 81 102.0 597.0 229.0 308.0 405.0 0.624 
US 295.8 89.9 147 33.0 557.0 246.0 283.0 354.0 0.021 
Southwest 233.6 80.4 198 35.0 552.0 174.0 226.0 281.5 1.254 
Table 17: Descriptive statistics of fares from DTW to SFO on different airlines 
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Figure 10: Boxplot of fares from DTW to SFO on different airlines 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Round-trip fare 376.4978 294.4865 61.99525 3860.002 
Market Structure Variables     
Market Share 0.5385714 0.2520368 0.000059 1 
HHI 0.5315661 0.1891035 0.1892121 1 
Hub 0.7322052 0.4428106 0 1 
Slot Restricted Airport 0.2540218 0.4353104 0 1 
Ticket Characteristics     
Advance Purchase Restriction     
0-day 0.3999497 0.4898882 0 1 
1-day 0.0174105 0.1307953 0 1 
3-day 0.0851643 0.2791264 0 1 
5-day 0.0009706 0.0311387 0 1 
7-day 0.2013381 0.4010005 0 1 
10-day 0.0238978 0.152731 0 1 
14-day 0.2439588 0.4294687 0 1 
21-day 0.0238581 0.1526072 0 1 
30-day 0.0034521 0.0586531 0 1 
Non-refundable 0.816421 0.3871409 0 1 
Saturday stay-over 0.1954375 0.3965375 0 1 
Travel restriction 0.441033 0.4965113 0 1 
Minimum stay required 0.2407825 0.427559 0 1 
Maximum stay restriction 0.2107878 0.4078684 0 1 
Days prior to departure after 
ticket purchased 
15.86586 20.722 0 202 
Full coach fare class 0.089137 0.2849417 0 1 
One-way 0.2337481 0.4232143 0 1 
Route Specific Characteristics     
Presence of low-cost carriers 0.4667308 0.4988925 0 1 
Presence of Southwest  0.0644275 0.2455131 0 1 
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Distance 956.0081 636.2608 185 2704 
Tourist share 0.5611523 0.0689261 0.4055 0.7605 
Average population 1975896 1581949 233014.6 5974809 
Average per-capita income 36546.15 3396.173 23808 45046.49 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics 
 Advance 
purchase 
Non-
refundable 
Saturday 
stay-over 
Travel 
restriction 
Minimum 
stay 
Maximum 
stay 
Advance 
purchase 
1      
Non-
refundable 
0.4149 1     
Saturday 
stay-over 
0.3042 0.1915 1    
Travel 
restriction 
0.2516 0.2885 0.1962    
Minimum 
stay 
0.3566 0.2667 0.1649 0.2822 1  
Maximum 
stay 
0.1970 0.2451 0.1199 0.2968 0.6006 1 
Table 19: Correlations between each type of ticket restrictions 
Destination Airline Gini 
American           0.2650 
Delta           0.2360 
United           0.2756 
US           0.1835 
BOS 
Southwest           0.1787 
American           0.1086 
Delta           0.1461 
Frontier           0.1814 
AirTran           0.1693 
Spirit           0.2622 
United           0.1344 
US           0.1020 
DEN 
Southwest           0.1359 
American           0.2026 
Delta           0.2302 
Spirit           0.1882 
DFW 
US           0.2045 
American           0.1134  
Delta           0.1269 
Frontier           0.1423 
AirTran           0.1260  
Spirit           0.1367  
United           0.1073  
US           0.1118 
LAS 
Southwest           0.1041 
LAX American           0.2259 
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Delta           0.2226    
Frontier           0.1792 
Spirit           0.1793 
United           0.2047 
US           0.1793 
 
Southwest           0.1781  
American           0.2350 
Delta           0.2569 
Spirit           0.1906 
United           0.2261 
US           0.1956 
LGA 
Southwest           0.2209 
American           0.1011 
Delta           0.1621 
Frontier           0.1314 
United           0.2004 
US           0.1365 
PHX 
Southwest           0.1260 
American          0.2210 
Delta          0.1985 
Frontier          0.1675 
United          0.2798 
US          0.2135 
SEA 
Southwest          0.2092 
American          0.2562 
Delta          0.2285 
Frontier          0.1811 
AirTran          0.1712 
United          0.2020 
US          0.1691 
SFO 
Southwest          0.1822 
Table 20: Gini coefficient of fares from DTW to different destinations on different airlines 
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Figure 11: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to BOS 
 
 
Figure 12: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to DEN 
 
 
Figure 13: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to DFW 
 
 
Figure 14: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to LAS 
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Figure 15: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to LAX 
 
 
Figure 16: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to LGA 
 
 
Figure 17: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to PHX 
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Figure 18: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to SEA 
 
 
Figure 19: Market share, by proportion of total customers flying from DTW to SFO 
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 Round-trip fare 
Interaction terms  
Market share * travel restriction -59.705099 
 (77.637573) 
HHI * travel restriction -29.182481 
 (151.430863) 
Market structure variables  
Market share 71.227245 
 (84.892653) 
HHI -17.845604 
 (126.582190) 
Hub  52.793239 
 (20.763081)* 
Slot restricted airport 94.605681 
 (32.460102)** 
Ticket characteristics  
Travel restriction -96.518513 
 (64.319148) 
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -1.622273 
 (0.188452)** 
Full coach fare class 401.832913 
 (60.962708)** 
One-way 82.473387 
 (8.312461)** 
Route specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carrier -46.184173 
 (18.958854)* 
Presence of southwest airlines -67.345890 
 (25.648847)** 
Distance  0.328027 
 (0.095397)** 
Distance squared  -0.000067 
 (0.000031)* 
Tourist share -186.802805 
 (106.299543) 
Average population 0.000000 
 (0.000008) 
Average per capita income -0.001078 
 (0.003039) 
Constant  259.472111 
 (138.938311) 
Carrier fixed effects Yes 
R2 0.42 
N 453,347 
Table 21: Regression estimation under the unrestricted model under travel day restriction 
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 Round-trip fare 
Interaction terms  
Market share * minimum stay -49.888820 
 (72.219130) 
HHI  * minimum stay 91.307262 
 (156.693338) 
Market structure variables  
Market share 61.849472 
 (71.575805) 
HHI -7.260193 
 (109.103447) 
Hub  63.010534 
 (22.330121)** 
Slot restricted airport 96.726275 
 (32.153138)** 
Ticket characteristics  
Minimum stay -119.507432 
 (62.646027) 
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -1.755286 
 (0.174059)** 
Full coach fare class 428.422034 
 (61.284509)** 
One-way 92.918703 
 (8.697131)** 
Route specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carrier -62.022506 
 (21.751606)** 
Presence of southwest airlines -86.918154 
 (30.328195)** 
Distance  0.297701 
 (0.094437)** 
Distance squared -0.000055 
 (0.000031) 
Tourist share -203.825335 
 (115.372924) 
Average population 0.000001 
 (0.000008) 
Average per-capita income -0.003867 
 (0.003207) 
Constant  333.946671 
 (140.093845)* 
Carrier fixed effects Yes 
R2 0.39 
N 453,347 
Table 22: Regression estimation under the unrestricted model under minimum stay  
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 Round-trip fare 
Interaction terms  
Market share * maximum stay -20.800451 
 (56.950656) 
HHI * maximum stay 41.673178 
 (119.323412) 
Market structure variables  
Market share 55.947121 
 (66.076193) 
HHI 0.253344 
 (90.358586) 
Hub 62.832459 
 (21.963151)** 
Slot restricted airport 89.213268 
 (31.930915)** 
Ticket characteristics  
Days prior to departure after ticket purchase -1.908903 
 (0.193171)** 
Maximum stay -108.385313 
 (46.177284)* 
Full coach fare class 430.701144 
 (61.829463)** 
One-way 95.520709 
 (9.207275)** 
Route specific characteristics  
Presence of low cost carrier -58.055047 
 (20.495517)** 
Presence of southwest airlines -80.077350 
 (28.855996)** 
Distance  0.306766 
 (0.096168)** 
Distance squared -0.000061 
 (0.000032) 
Tourist share -188.769515 
 (113.131006) 
Average population 0.000004 
 (0.000008) 
Average per capita income -0.002342 
 (0.003108) 
Constant  261.521804 
 (137.267228) 
Carrier fixed effects Yes 
R2 0.39 
N 453,347 
Table 23: Regression estimation under the unrestricted model under maximum stay  
 
 
